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The conflicts structuring European society since the 1980s such as identity and 
immigration have affected countries in a parallel manner in response to globalization, known as 
the emerging transnational cleavage. However, why do far-right parties find great success in 
some countries related to this new cleavage and limited or no success in similar countries? 
Examining France and Germany, this comparative study deservedly draws national 
characteristics like history and culture to center-stage. By re-evaluating extant literature with this 
new perspective, this research has found that while the transnational cleavage was present in 
both countries, Germany was hindered by a strong institutional resistance to National Socialism, 
rife with internal party disputes, and a difficult federal structure for far-right parties to find 
success past the local level. Meanwhile France was successful in constructing a winning 
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Under what conditions do far-right parties emerge? This question is the focus of much 
ongoing academic research, especially since the emergence of ‘post-industrial’ far-right parties 
in the mid-1970s and beyond. Across Europe, these parties have experienced electoral success in 
the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Austria to name a few prominent cases. In general terms, far-
right parties can be characterized by “an emphasis of natural community and hostility towards 
foreigners…a distrust for democratic individual representation…a call for unbounded authority 
and the recasting of a strong state” (Ignazi 2003, 18). These common features help to provide a 
base through which to analyze the similarities and differences between countries in which these 
kinds of parties emerge or attempt to emerge.  
Concurrent with the ‘third-wave’ of right-wing extremism during the 1970s and 1980s, 
the conflicts of the post-industrial society which include multiculturalism, identity, globalization 
and supranationalism have become prevalent matters of political contestation (Ignazi 2003, 20). 
Far-right parties fuel political discourse with Islamophobia, xenophobia, and outright racism in a 
capacity that mainstream parties are unable to, making their position on these issues relevant for 
established parties if they are to compete in the political landscape (Rippeyoung 2007, 381; 
Meyer and Rosenberger 2015, 2). The increasing success of far-right parties has sparked debate 
about the future stability of Western European democracies as well as issues related to 
multiculturalism and the integration of different immigrant communities which makes it a timely 
research topic.  
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Cleavage theory, developed by Lipset and Rokkan in 1967, provides a frame of reference 
to understand political contestation and how parties react to societal cleavages or conflicts that 
emerged from industrial revolutions in Europe. The theory is useful in understanding not only 
how these cleavages came to form, but also how challenger parties, such as the far-right, stake 
their claim in the existing political structure in response to new lines of conflict regarding post-
material values. In recent years, political scientists have observed the emergence of a new 
transnational cleavage based largely on cultural issues that has shaped competition between 
parties in the 21st century. Far-right parties fit into this new line of conflict by taking hold of this 
transnational cleavage and challenging existing parties on these cultural issues.  
However, the emergence and subsequent success of far-right parties and their ability to 
compete along this new cleavage varies greatly across Europe. This begs the question – if 
European countries in the 1970s were experiencing the same social phenomena with similar 
transformations in the dimensions structuring the political space, why do these parties become 
firmly rooted in the political landscape in some countries while they have limited success in 
others?   
The far-right party family is complex and research has been devoted to not only 
classifying where these parties stand on issues, but understanding their bases of support and how 
they fit into the existing political structure of contestation. In order to address how these parties 
came to be successful, a large portion of previous research has focused on national case studies 
or large cross-national comparisons. In looking at various countries at once, important country-
specific factors such as history or culture are not given the attention they deserve, which limits 
the results. While worthwhile for extracting general conclusions, these national case studies 
emphasize important factors in one particular context but report the same factors as unimportant 
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in others (Norris 2005, 9). In order to overcome these shortcomings, the cases focus on France 
and Germany. While France has been the prototype for the far-right in Europe since the 1980s, 
Germany has not had a successful contender until 2017. Thus, my research will fill a gap in the 
literature by focusing on a controlled systematic comparative analysis of two case countries. This 
narrow focus will illuminate the complexities of the far-right party family and shed insight into 
the history of these parties in both countries as well as the differences in the emergence of new 
challenger parties.  
By exploring these relationships, a contribution to the broader literature on far-right 
parties will be made by complementing and adding to existing knowledge about this party 
family. By looking in detail at two countries, country-specific factors – which are often 
overlooked in cross-national examinations- are easier to analyze. This will lead to a greater 
explanation about the emergence of far-right parties. Furthermore, the analysis will help to 
further develop research regarding the transnational cleavage, since it is the newest and deserves 
more scholarly attention.   
My guiding research question throughout the thesis will be: What determines the time of 
emergence of far-right parties in France and Germany? By using cleavage theory to help answer 
the puzzle set out above, I formulate two expectations regarding far-right parties in France and 
Germany: 1) the Rassemblement National (RN) in France was able to be a stronger actor on the 
political stage than the Alternative fur Deutschland (AfD) in Germany due to a less 
institutionalized cultural resistance to Vichy as there was to Nazism in Germany; and 2) the new 
cultural cleavage that emerged (which allowed far-right parties to challenge existing parties on 
issues such as immigration and cultural identity) was more firmly rooted in France than in 
Germany. To uncover the causal mechanisms behind these expectations, the systematic 
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comparison of the case countries using second hand literature on the topic will be conducted 
under three main categories: a) social framework conditions, b) electoral systems and gains, and 
c) party leadership and organization. The similarities of both countries will be taken into account 
while placing emphasis on the differences in the key variable: the timing of emergence of far-
right parties.  
Results show that the transnational cleavage was present in both countries and that parties 
were responding to the same issues of this cleavage. The difficulty in the case of Germany was 
more institutional, meaning that parties had to not only pass the 5 percent threshold for 
representation, but also had to establish a wide network of national organizations. France was 
successful in crafting a message that appealed to many in response to the transnational cleavage, 
and continues to modernize its platform.  
Theory/Background- Literature Review 
The study of far-right parties has evolved since the post-war period and its focus has 
shifted to answer new questions. Art lays out a short summary of the four main stages of political 
science research on the topic to include: a) why far-right parties emerged in advanced industrial 
societies b) why their emergence has varied across different countries c) how their party 
programs are constructed to appeal to middle and working class voters and d) how far-right 
parties interact with existing political parties (2007, 331-332).  These classifications are similar 
to the supply and demand factors developed to explain how far-right parties gain success. 
Demand factors are those that make far right parties appealing such as modernization grievances, 
economic grievances exemplified by slogans such as “Eliminate Unemployment: Stop 
Immigration”, and cultural grievances which include the incompatibility of immigrant behavioral 
norms and cultural values with those of the native population (Golder 2016, 482-485). Supply 
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factors are more structural and include electoral rules (how seats are translated into votes), party 
competition (how mainstream parties converge), the media, political cleavage structure, party 
organization (the existence of local branches), and a winning ideology (stressing ideological 
rationalizations of national belonging) (Golder 2016, 486-490).  Research on the far-right has 
adapted in its approach to understand these complex parties and continues to seek a multifaceted 
approach to the puzzle. Cleavages are part demand and part supply factors and give a helpful 
framework to analyze the ongoing progression of far-right parties.  
What shapes political contestation in Europe and where do far-right parties fit in to the 
existing structure? Based on Lipset and Rokkan’s seminal article (1967), cleavages are defined 
as the boundaries of how political parties react to societal pressures. The authors present 
cleavage theory as a way to understand parties as “alliances in conflicts over policies and value 
commitments within the larger body politic” (1967, 5). They describe the postwar national party 
system as the result of underlying social, territorial and functional cleavages that grew out of 
national and industrial revolutions in Europe. The four main cleavages include: center vs. 
periphery, state vs. church, owner vs. worker and land vs. industry which all translate into 
political competition in the way political parties responded to these issues. The cleavages all 
build on one another and are the outcome of repeated conflict. As such, parties became solidified 
based on their response to these cleavages and collective identities played a large part in how 
citizens responded to these issues. Social cleavage theory has been influential in providing a 
framework to understand how political parties respond and adapt to new issues that arise in 
society.  
Since 1967, research stemming from cleavage theory has come to understand that new 
cleavages have emerged. The manner in which established parties react to these new cleavages 
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has effects for new challenger parties and the political system as a whole. This process is 
important to consider in understanding the emergence of the far-right and how it has become an 
institutionalized actor in France and an outlying actor in Germany.  
The traditional class and religious cleavages present in Lipset and Rokkan’s original 
work have accommodated new dimensions that currently undergird party interactions. The 
religious cleavage has been transformed into “a new cultural dimension of conflict” while the 
state-market cleavage still plays a role in shaping the political landscape (Bornschier 2012, 123). 
This shift corresponds to social movements and the diffusion of new ideals and values which in 
turn have created new objects of political conflict. The change can be observed in the spread of 
conflict over postmaterialist values which has reconstructed the traditional political alignments 
present in society. Resultingly, new concerns such as national identity and security have become 
prevalent and established parties must come up with an adequate response or risk being 
overshadowed by challenger parties that can meet citizen demand on these issues sufficiently 
(Veugelers 1997, 31-32, 45).  
The development of postmaterialist values has its roots in the New Social Movements 
spurred by the left in the 1970s and 1980s. Leaders from this movement, inspired by newly 
diffused universalistic values, called for individual autonomy and free choice over lifestyles. 
This, in turn, spurred a counter-movement by conservatives in the 1980s and 1990s which used 
immigration as a means to mobilize “diffuse anti-universalistic counter-potential against the 
libertarian left” (Bornschier 2012, 123). Due to this new conflict, the lines of political 
contestation have been redrawn. Since the 1980s, issues such as immigration and national 
identity have been at the forefront of political competition – which is concurrent with the rise of 
post-materialist far-right parties.  
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How can we conceptualize of this radical shift in the cleavages underlying political 
contestation? Consistent with the changes previously mentioned, a new cleavage has been 
identified: the transnational cleavage. This new transnational cleavage stems from conflict 
regarding the “defense of national political, social and economic ways of life against external 
actors who penetrate the state by migrating, exchanging goods or exerting rule” (Hooghe and 
Marks 2018, 110). This cleavage is concurrent with the phenomenon of globalization, the 
intensification of the European integration process since the 1993 Maastricht Treaty, and the 
creation of supranational institutions such as the World Trade Organization (Hooghe and Marks 
2018, 113-114). With the increase of transnational mobility of capital, goods, labor and services 
across the Schengen area, highly specialized jobs with mobility became prioritized over manual 
labor. The continuing integration process also raises questions regarding national identity as 
member states continue to cede sovereignty to supranational institutions and collaborate 
transnationally, which has struck fear in conservatives that national sovereignty would be 
unjustly given away. Thus, many who felt as if they were losing status within these new 
developments, sought refuge in nationalism and traditional values.  
This return to values is a product of dramatic upheavals in society that cause some 
members of the population to be disoriented and feel a sense of loss and political alienation 
(Decker 2008, 122). This new cleavage built upon the already mentioned classical cleavages and 
left party systems in the current day to be “characterized by a weakening of the classical lines of 
social conflict: class, religious denomination and the urban/rural divide...the development of new 
frontlines, namely identity and culture, that often intersect the old ones, and influence voting 
behavior” (Backes 2018, 19). Contestation is structured around how parties are able to respond to 
these new emerging social issues and how voters react to them.  
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With knowledge of this new cleavage in mind, how are far-right parties able to stake their 
claim in an altered political contestation space? The essential point regarding far-right parties 
and new cleavage structures is that when established parties are unable to react to the new 
demands of the transnational cleavage, a new space emerges for far-right parties to exploit and 
gain support based on emerging conflicts. Research emanating from cleavage theory has shown 
that parties do not change their stance on issues such as integration ‘to any great degree’ and they 
stay within their own ‘bounded rationality’ which leaves space for new challengers to take 
advantage of this new space on the political landscape (Backes 2018, 19).  Furthermore, these 
‘challenger’ parties emphasize their extreme positions on salient issues such as immigration 
more than parties who take moderate positions.  Far-right parties occupy space along this 
cleavage by taking “more extreme positions on these issues, placing more salience on them, and 
exhibiting greater internal unity than mainstream parties” (Hooghe and Marks 2018, 111). In 
doing so, far-right parties are able to take ownership of issues that directly relate to the 
transnational cleavage and feelings of alienation by some members of society. With this 
ownership, established parties could be forced into competition over these new issues. However, 
this pressure depends on the strength of their far-right challenger, with more stable far-right 
parties able to alienate voters from mainstream parties (Meyer and Rosenberger 2015, 3). This 
has implications for our case countries since the RN was able to insert itself on the political 
scene earlier and gain more stability through the years, unlike Germany. Far-right parties have 
carved out a space on the political landscape that can be successfully exploited and have 
solidified themselves as the main actor on that end of the spectrum.  
Across Europe, far-right parties have made their mark on the political scene with 
electoral gains in a number of countries such as the Netherlands with the Lijst Pim Fortuyn 
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(LPF) in 2002, the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) which became the strongest party in 1999, the 
Austrian Freedom Party (FPO) which won 27 percent of the vote in the 1999 elections and 
became part of a coalition government, and more recently Vox in Spain winning 10.3 percent of 
the vote in the 2019 general elections and 12 seats in the 2018 regional elections in Andalusia 
(Meyer and Rosenberger 2015, 1; Otero-Iglesias). The breakthrough and ensuing success of far-
right parties since the 1980s sheds new light on the assumption that Lipset and Rokkan made in 
their original 1967 article that party systems in Europe were largely ‘frozen’ , meaning that once 
a cleavage structure was well established in society, it provided a strong basis for conflict and 
voters grew attached to established political parties (von Schoultz 2017, 32-33).  With challenges 
from the far-right, party systems have changed which further complicates the puzzle surrounding 
their emergence. Thus, the emergence of new social cleavages can be seen as “necessary but not 
sufficient conditions” (Norris 2005, 3) that allow minor parties to breakthrough and become 
more established eventually. Cleavage theory can be used as a structural framework to 
understand the emergence of these parties. The subsequent success depends heavily on how a 
party frames its ideological appeals within the electoral system and landscape of political 
contestation. While cleavages are not necessarily specific to far-right parties - and could function 
to explain the rise of any minor party along the political spectrum- for the purposes of this paper 
they provide a compelling explanation to provide more clarity on a party family that is 
complicated and diverse.  
Why France and Germany?   
France and Germany serve as excellent cases regarding my research question for a 
variety of purposes. They are similar in many ways, but with a difference in a key variable: the 
timing of emergence of far-right parties. For this reason, a comparative approach is helpful in 
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this area of research. As Skocpol and Somers describe, comparative research as macro-analysis 
is worthwhile because it allows causal hypotheses about macro-phenomena to be tested (1980, 
88).  This approach seeks to “contrast cases in which the phenomenon to be explained and the 
hypothesized causes are present to other cases in which the phenomenon and the causes are both 
absent, although they are as similar as possible to the “positive” cases in other respects – known 
as Mill’s Method of Difference” (Skocpol and Somers 1980, 79). In the two countries chosen, 
both share many overall similarities and one crucial difference: the timing in emergence of a far-
right contender party. While it may not be generalizable to the entirety of the phenomenon of far-
right parties across Europe, it provides context to understand the underlying dimensions and 
processes that drive and motivate far-right parties. More importantly, it allows for the culture and 
historical context of each country to be kept of importance and factored into the analysis at a 
deeper level.  
The goal with this method of analysis is to make causal inferences about macro-level 
occurrences and processes. The two countries are similar in many aspects – both democracies, 
with similar levels of immigration in recent years, affected by issues of the new transnational 
cleavage, and similar electoral systems- but with contrasting cases – the emergence of far-right 
parties at drastically different periods in time. Both France and Germany are considered to have 
‘two-dimensionality’ in regards to the structure of the political space meaning it has an economic 
and cultural dimension (Kriesi et al 2006, 949). In a similar way, both countries have 
experienced a shift in the cultural dimension of this space with new issues being integrated, 
immigration being the most important. Furthermore, the poles of the political structure are 
becoming increasingly polarized with the cultural dimension gaining importance as the basis 
through which new parties seek to ‘mobilize’ their electorate (Kriesi et al 2006, 950).  
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As mentioned before, the political landscape across Europe shifted in response to conflict 
over new post-materialist values. Isolated populist movements had been present in France such 
as the Poujadistes in the Fourth Republic, but this took place in a specific place in a certain time 
frame. The conflicts over modernization in the 21st century are so interconnected that the 
economic, cultural and political problems that affect one country likely affect more and more 
countries at once (Decker 2008, 123). This adds to the explanation of the ‘parallel nature’ of the 
changes in the political landscapes in many European countries and sheds light on why ‘new 
populists’ have not disappeared from the political scene as observers had expected they would 
(Decker 2008, 123). France and Germany both underwent these transformations, but the ways in 
which far-right parties integrated themselves into the shifting dimensions of the political space 
varies.   
Since the French far-right party is one of the longest lasting in Europe, comparing it with 
Germany allows for the possibility of understanding its effect on the emergence of similar parties 
in other countries. Parties such as the Republican Party (REP) in Germany have stated the 
explicit desire to turn themselves into a right-wing populist party inspired by the French Front 
National (Bornschier 2012, 125). Furthermore, previous research has found that far-right parties 
in Europe use the RN as a model to construct a ‘master frame’ through which they express their 
‘perception of the societal sphere’ with a compelling party platform (Van Hauwaert 2019, 132-
134).  
Another valuable point of comparison is that Germany was never thought to be a 
breeding ground for far-right parties due to its experience with Nazism. A ‘culture of contrition’ 
was the product of an examination of the Nazi past and a sensitivity to any party or movement 
that resembled the Nazis in any way (Art 2007, 338). Despite this resistance and to the shock of 
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many, we see the AfD emerge in 2013. On the other hand, since Germany underwent the same 
transformation of the political space as other European countries did in response to 
modernization, it is surprising that a far-right party did not emerge sooner especially in the East 
where many areas experienced social insecurity following the collapse of the Communist regime 
(Decker 2008, 120). Interestingly, the National Democratic Party (NPD), with neofascist 
tendencies received 4.9% of the vote in 1969 following the first grand coalition between the 
CDU-CSU/SPD, which points to Germany’s past experience with far-right parties and their 
failure to institutionalize, which further complicates the puzzle.  In a similar vein, large parts of 
the German electorate were “just as sympathetic to various racist appeals as electorates in other 
countries” which coincides with the rise of Islamophobia and anti-immigrant attitudes that form 
part of the transnational cleavage (Berbuir et al 2015, 158). This paradox coupled with the early 
and permanent emergence of a far-right party in France makes it a compelling case worth further 
investigation.  
Timing is a critical factor in the emergence of far-right parties. Once a far-right party is 
firmly established at various levels of government with strong levels of support across the 
electorate, it is difficult to eradicate them. By understanding this, we can view the development 
of far-right parties as ‘path-dependent’ meaning that small causes may come to have large 
consequences over time which affects the trajectory of parties (Art 2007, 332). It can be said to 
occur when a previous decision ‘reinforces itself’ and determines in a small part how future 
developments will unravel (Hansen 2002, 269). As a temporal reference, we can consider the 
2008 financial crisis and the 2015 migration crisis as a marker to compare our two cases. These 
two large-scale events, mobilized voters along the transnational cleavage in a way that had not 
been seen previously and was an issue that drove support among far-right parties.  
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All of the above factors such as cleavages, immigration, and culture may end up leading 
in the same direction and thus cause the final outcome of emergence to be overdetermined. 
However, with this in mind as one of the potential limitations of this research, there are still 
valuable conclusions that can be drawn from the comparison. Additionally, the analysis could 
fall short since I am comparing a well-established party (RN) to a relatively young party (AfD). 
To remedy this, I have included a discussion of two older far-right parties in Germany that never 
gained much electoral success to set a context for the struggles of this party family in Germany.  
Table 1 below summarizes the comparative aspects of the two case countries to visually 
present the basis for the comparison.  
 France Germany 
Electoral System 2-vote majoritarian PR (5% threshold) 
Traditional Cleavages Yes Yes  
Two-dimensionality Yes  Yes  
2015 Refugee Crisis Yes Yes 
2008 Economic Crisis Yes Yes  
Transnational Cleavage Yes Yes 
Far Right Party Yes (1972)  No (until 2013) 
Table 1: Comparative aspects of case countries 
Social Framework Conditions   
To understand the nature of the far-right in France and Germany, we must first look at the 
conditions that allowed this type of challenger party to emerge. While both countries experience 
two-dimensionality in the political space, they have similar, yet distinct social factors in which 
the far-right presented themselves as a solution. Many of these factors relate to the transnational 
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cleavage to include conflict over immigration, identity and multiculturalism. Of utmost 
importance for these parties is how they respond to the transnational cleavage by “constructing 
their strategic ideological appeals around cultural protectionism, within the constraints set by the 
broader electoral system and the distribution of public opinion” (Norris 2005, 8).  
Both the RN and the AfD respond to new conflicts of the transnational cleavage. In the 
case of the RN, their electoral breakthrough is multifaceted and a result of both internal and 
external factors. The AfD is similar although its main ideological appeal in the early stages was 
economic rather than cultural. Within the RN, its early radical elements (direct association with 
Nazi and fascist parties) were removed and it began to promote a broader populist message 
focused on law and order and immigration. In the external landscape, economic and social 
determinants led to the emergence of the RN on the French political scene.  
A major political issue of the 1970s and 1980s when the RN was founded was 
decolonization in Algeria. From this debate stemmed the subsequent terrorist attacks by the 
Organisation Armée Secrète (OAS) and the migration of one million French pieds noirs settlers 
from Algeria back to France. During this time, anti-Arab feelings also began to mount as well as 
aversion to foreigners spurred in part by the 400,000 Algerians who were to receive French 
citizenship in the 1970s; public opinion was divided as to whether the state should consider them 
French or something different (Cincu 2017, 36). Soft policies on law and order instituted by the 
left-wing Mitterrand government as well as an increase in public sensitivity towards 
immigration, namely of Muslims, and multiculturalism laid the ground for an increased salience 
of these issues in the political arena.  
The RN was also able to exert its ‘créneaux porteurs’ (niche) in the political agenda and 
the mainstream right began to integrate RN program elements such as strict immigration, order 
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and social insecurity into their political discourses (Stockemer and Amengay 2015, 373). This 
inclusion further legitimized the RN and helped to broaden their base. In the wake of the oil 
crisis in 1973, France was grappling with high unemployment and voters were dissatisfied with 
the present state of the economy. Additionally, fears over the continuing process of European 
integration and uncertainties in the post-communist era played a role. In a more covert sense, a 
‘silent counter revolution’ that promoted traditional values such as family and religion in protest 
of the post-materialist values of the sixties was underway which adds another layer of appeal to 
the RN’s message. Jean-Marie Le Pen constructed immigration as a key issue and was successful 
in “linking it to public insecurity, national identity, social security and the labor market” in an 
effort to gain electoral appeal from those who felt concerned over these issues (Stockemer 2017, 
29).  
Many of the debates surrounding multiculturalism and anti-immigration policies in 
France are highly gendered and also involve the interplay of religion and secularism. As the RN 
has begun to modernize itself under new leadership with the election of Marine Le Pen as 
president of the party in January 2011, there are still linkages with the past (Mayer 2015, 391). 
These are prevalent in an appeal to the issue of cultural differences framed in a new way to 
appeal to a generational shift. The RN has shifted its discourse on two main issues – the defense 
of the family and the difficulty of new immigration. Previously the RN had constructed a 
narrative surrounding the radicalized immigrant man as a ‘sexual and cultural threat’ to female 
citizens, whereas today the party uses the new visibility of radicalized women as a symbol of 
feminine oppression in debates on the Muslim headscarf and sexual violence (Scrinzi 2017, 136). 
This shift shows how the RN adds a gender dimension to their arguments for anti-immigration 
policies. Since they have a fundamentalist view of Islam, the party uses immigrant women as the 
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victims of patriarchal practices which they condemn. On the contrary, Le Pen’s proposals on 
women claim rights for women of her own ‘community’ (based on nationality and culture) and 
opposes these same rights for female ‘others’ such as immigrants (Scrinzi 2017, 137). Gender 
has been placed in the spotlight to give credibility to anti-immigrant position in defense of 
feminism and preserving national culture against outsiders. In a similar way, we can observe the 
platform of the party under Marine to be more restrictive regarding immigration, but recast as 
“strongly populist” by proposing Chauvinistic welfare measures such as the elimination of 
pensions for foreigners (Stockemer 2017, 32-33).  
Understanding all of the above factors, the RN shifted its rhetoric from an ‘us vs. them’ 
discourse to allow for the inclusion of new political ‘enemies’ such as the elite driven European 
Union and international political institutions that were seen as encroaching on French 
sovereignty (Stockemer and Amengay 2015, 373). The French ideal of souverinisme 
encapsulates this idea with a longing for a return to the “old religion of tightly controlled borders 
and the unfettered sovereignty of nation-states” which the RN has evoked in its platform 
(Heisbourg 2015, 10).  
The far-right parties that emerged in Germany responded to many of the same issues as 
France, however they drew on different historical contexts. Of the right-wing parties in 
Germany, the NPD was the most similar in its ideology to National Socialism than others – 
which led it to be distinctly extremist. By using labels such as the “social homeland party”, they 
advocate for the reemergence of an “ethnic community” where the family is that “bearer of 
biological heritage” (Backes 2018, 5-6). The inclusion of German nationalism and anti-Semitism 
was an attempt to gain support based on history and cultural racism. The REP employed a 
17 
similar assemblage of right-wing extremism and populism, with a much more charismatic leader, 
but was not successful. 
The AfD was able to mobilize voters on its comparably moderate platform as opposed to 
previous far right parties and the eurocrisis allowed it to attract disenchanted middle-class voters 
from the established parties who felt the need to vote in protest of the current system. They 
present themselves as socially protective and are skeptical of capitalism while on the whole 
advocating for neoliberal policies. The main focus of its campaign has been its anti-
establishment and anti-Euro positions (Berbuir et al 2015, 155).  
From the outset, AfD party leaders made a conscious effort to avoid any sort of 
association with populist parties such as the Austrian Freedom Party since they saw themselves 
are more moderate than the others because of their strong emphasis on a free market. Part of their 
advantage was the way in which their economically liberal and conservative positions are fused 
into a brand of “national populism that emphasizes the superiority of the own national economic 
model over that of other nations and cultures” (Decker 2016, 5). Furthermore, as the salience of 
the eurocrisis decreased in 2014, the party was able to capitalize on the new terrorist threat posed 
by the Islamic State and the influx of refugees and asylum seekers. Now more than ever, the far-
right concerns of national identity began to become a dominant issue on voters’ minds and polls 
show that immigration was a top topic when asked about what determined their vote choice in 
the federal elections (Decker 2016, 6). In their platform they deny multiculturalism and condemn 
non-heteronormative lifestyles and political correctness (Berbuir et al 2015, 165). In a similar 
way to France with the manif de tous (an anti-marriage equality organization), the AfD showed 
similar references to Christian-conservative anti-equality discourse by mentioning the loss of the 
“traditional” Germany family as a major issue (Berbuir et al 2015, 167).  
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One of the main issues they see as plaguing modern Germany is immigration and they 
advocate for a strict control of migration and that those who come in must “adjust to Germany 
society, not the other way around” (Backes 2018, 6). Immigration is a key issue along the new 
transnational cleavage and far-right parties take extreme positions on it. They also invoke 
traditional Christian values and reject Islam as a religion that belongs to another culture, but it 
does not rule out the possibility that Muslims could be accepted if they “live with us and are 
peacefully integrated” (Backes 2018, 7). Unlike the NPD, they are not overtly disloyal to the 
existing political structure and keep a safe distance from radical anti-capitalism and the overt 
anti-Semitism that other far right parties have promoted in the past, which worked to their 
success.  
The 2008 Eurocrisis and 2015 Refugee Crisis  
The impact of the eurozone crisis of 2008 and the refugee crisis of 2015 presented both 
parties with a space in the political contestation landscape to capture as their own. In the case of 
the RN, both conflicts added salience to popular arguments about leaving the EU and the effects 
of immigration on national identity. For the AfD, the financial crisis was one of the primary 
reasons the party came to be and the refugee crisis proved to be a significant event the party 
could galvanize even more voters with and eventually reach an electoral breakthrough.  
The eurozone crisis affected Europe as a whole, but the focus and frame of the issue 
surrounded Greece (Decker 2016, 7). The effects of this crisis led to doubts about the European 
Union, as a growing supranational entity, to resolve issues in an efficient manner which came to 
be known as Euroscepticism. The economic crisis led to a rise in Euroscepticism and backlash 
against the centrist parties that had advocated for its creation, resulting in an identity crisis 
through which the far-right was able to ‘effectively cultivate’ (Polyakova and Shekhovtsov 2016, 
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71). Central messages from the parties such as the potential for the “Islamization” of Europe 
became more and more salient. During the refugee crisis, primarily Muslim refugees hoping to 
escape the escalating violence of the war in Syria, sought refuge in Europe. It is estimated that 
Germany registered 1.1 million refugees during this time and France also received many, 
although Germany was the target destination (Polyakova and Shekhovtsov 2016, 71; Heisbourg 
2015, 8). Furthermore, terrorist attacks in Paris and Cologne as well as debates surrounding 
asylum laws, politicized the issue in a way that allowed the RN and AfD to attract voters based 
on these issues (Decker 2016, 10). The combined force of the eurozone crisis, rising 
Euroscepticism, and the refugee crisis provided a turning point for the RN to experience a rise in 
support similar to 2002 and allowed the AfD to break past the 5 percent electoral threshold and 
gain credibility as a legitimate political party.  
The refugee crisis turned out to be an “unexpected gift” for the AfD and their electoral 
trajectory (Decker 2016, 10). The party took up the space along the political contestation 
structure to frame themselves as the “sole medium of protest for a population deeply unsettled by 
uncontrolled migrant streams” which mainstream parties were unable to take a stance on (Decker 
2016, 10). In the case of the RN, the refugee crisis could provide the party with further pretext 
“not only to instrumentalize its immigration leitmotif but also to recruit followers” (Stockemer 
2017, 97).  
The social cleavages such as immigration, economic issues, and multiculturalism were 
present in both countries but the far-right only emerges successfully in one earlier. This suggests 
that there is another causal mechanism at work to explain the difference in emergence of these 
parties.  
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Electoral Systems and Gains  
Structural supply factors such as electoral systems and party competition also play a role 
in the timing and emergence of far-right parties. The importance of electoral rules shapes not 
only the degree of party fragmentation, but also how competition plays out. The electoral system 
is a crucial component because it determines how votes are translated into seats.  
 France has a 2-vote majoritarian system while Germany has a proportional 
representation system with a 5 percent threshold for representation in the Federal Bundestag. 
Previous literature on electoral systems and far-right parties posits that in proportional 
representation systems, far-right parties can gain seats by adopting a “bonding” strategy in which 
they emphasize the “signature ideological appeals which distinguish them most clearly from 
mainstream competitors on the center-right and center-left” (Norris 2005, 7). In this electoral 
system, competition is spread across the ideological spectrum and issue space and does not 
convene around a central point. In majoritarian systems, to be successful far-right parties must 
expand their party platform “beyond cultural protectionism to encompass a broader range of 
issues on the social and economic agenda and advocate for more conservative policies and 
constructing populist appeals based on vague rhetoric…largely devoid of any substantive policy 
content” (Norris 2005, 8). The French majoritarian system would suggest that there is a higher 
barrier for representation since parties require a simple plurality or majority of votes in each 
district in order to win. However, when we look at our cases, we can see that they present 
another paradox. The French system, which in theory would impede a small rising party is where 
we see one arise and become very successful while in the German system with its lower barrier 
for representation, a successful far-right party does not break through until the AfD in 2017.  
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The trajectory of the RN is considered to have two stages in its path to 
institutionalization: change and continuity (Veugelers 1997, 36). The first stage lasts about a 
decade when the RN saw weak gains, and mostly at the local level. It began to shift from a more 
marginal to more relevant party which could be seen in higher gains in local elections and in the 
1986 legislative elections where it won 35 seats in the National Assembly (Veugelers 1997, 36). 
The party began in 1972 under the auspices of the Ordre Nouveau and was meant to bring 
together the scattered groups of the extreme right to build electoral success in the 1973 
legislative elections. Jean-Marie Le Pen led the group with his reputation as a man of action who 
“was involved in all the battles of the extreme right, yet politically respectable;” he had founded 
the National Veterans Front, was a former president of a nationalist student association and took 
a hard stance of pro-French Algeria matters. However, the electoral success in the beginning was 
abysmal: in the May 1975 presidential elections Le Pen garnered a mere 0.62 percent of the 
votes, and it was not until the 1980s that things began to change (Stockemer and Amengay 2015, 
372). In the 1983 municipal elections the RN was able to ally itself with the moderate right, 
specifically the Gaullists, which allowed them to gain political legitimacy and visibility and more 
than ten RN town councilors were elected.  
The second stage -change- is considered to start after electoral gains in 1984 mentioned 
previously. During the 1984 European Parliament elections they won ten seats and a national 
audience of two million voters (Mayer 2018, 4). The party gained 9.7 percent of the votes in the 
legislative elections of 1986 and 15 percent in the 1997 elections. The peak of their success in 
the early years came in the presidential election in 2002 where Le Pen garnered 16.9 percent of 
the vote and qualified for the second round, surpassing the Socialist candidate Prime Minister 
Lionel Jospin (Mayer 2018, 5). This brought them even more national attention and signaled a 
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shift in the growing expressed support for the extreme right. After achieving relevance in the 
1980s, it did not revert back to the first stage but rather established itself as a firm actor in the 
political arena.  
While the success of the 2002 elections brought the RN to the attention of voters on a 
much wider scale, it also led to resistance which weakened its democratic legitimacy that it had 
tried hard to achieve. A strong anti-RN mobilization came about from established parties and the 
public, which led to dismal results in the years after. The party only received 10.4 percent of the 
vote in the 2007 presidential election and 4.3 percent in the following legislative elections 
(Mayer 2018, 8). After this, many believed this was the nail in the coffin for Le Pen, but the 
succession of the party leadership to his daughter Marine Le Pen would reinvigorate and 
transform the party into the RN we know today. The success in France with presidential elections 
suggests that these are more important than in the case of Germany, which places more emphasis 
on federal elections. It is interesting to note that we see peaks of support for the RN in France 
during years of presidential elections. This could be because they are directly elected and voters 




Table 2: Electoral gains of far-right in France 1973 – 2019 (percentage of votes cast) 
The electoral trajectory of the far-right in Germany has not reached as considerable 
success as it has in France. Previous nationalist populist right-wing parties in Germany include 
the National Democratic Party (NPD), the Republikaner (REP), and the DVU (German People’s 
Union), but neither reached significant electoral support to surpass the five percent threshold for 
representation at the federal level. The weakness of these older parties was due in part to the 
violence of extremist action-oriented groups such as neo-Nazis and skinheads whose influence 
expanded into the Eastern federal states after reunification. The movements were mostly local 
and they grew to become an essential element in the growth of right-wing extremism (Backes 
2018, 3). The mostly local presence of the parties combined with the federal structure of the 
country, poor organization of internal party dynamics, and resistance to Nazism made it difficult 
for these parties to find support at the national level.  
The NPD gained 4.3 of the electoral votes in the 1969 federal elections and was the only 
contender from the right that somewhat succeeded on a national level until the AfD (Berbuir et al 































































as well the grand coalition of the CDU/CSU and the SPD that was formed prior. The grand 
coalition was considered the “sore spot” of Germany politics at the time and the NPD presented 
themselves as the only authentic (right-wing) opposition party” (Mudde 2000, 27-28). However, 
since the NPD’s message of a credible opposition party did not translate into any seats in the 
Bundestag, potential voters for future elections began to shy away and internal struggles divided 
party leaders in the years following (Mudde 2000, 28). While the NPD was hopeful in its 
campaign, it was unable to establish itself early on the German political scene.  
 The NPD formed in 1964 during the ‘second wave’ of right-wing extremism, but saw its 
electoral successes diminish into the 1970s and into the 2000s never getting above 3 percent of 
votes (Decker 2008, 119-120). It achieved very slight success in local elections which grew with 
the increase of asylum seekers in the 1990s connected with a rise in xenophobic violence during 
this time. The party found a stronghold in Eastern Germany as well.  After a steady decline in 
support, only gaining 1 percent of the vote in the 2014 European Parliament elections, the NPD 
began to become insignificant. The party underwent financial struggles and a leadership shift 
within the party that led the party chairman and other long-term members to resign after the 
realization that the NPD had lost its power to mobilize support (Backes 2018, 4-5).  
The Republikaner (REP) is another example of a far-right party that did not gain much 
sustained success in Germany for a number of reasons. The REP broke away from the Bavarian 
CSU and employed a mix of right-wing extremism and populism with the help of charismatic 
leader Franz Schonhuber (Decker 2008, 129). The party’s anti-immigrant platform was its main 
tenant and aside from personality clashes and power struggles, it was unable to thrive due to the 
marginalization from mainstream parties. Its electoral breakthrough came in 1989 when it won 
7.1 percent of the vote in the European Parliament elections and also won seats in the Berlin state 
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elections (Decker 2008, 119; Art 2007, 338). Following that moment, politicians from 
mainstream parties in Berlin adopted a strategy of “marginalization, de-legitimation and 
stigmatization” known as ausgrenzung, which significantly reduced any chances the REP had to 
make a lasting impact on the political scene (Art 2007, 338).  
Ausgrenzung went into effect immediately following the 1989 elections with the CDU 
prohibiting “personal contact with REP politicians, reliance on REP votes to pass legislation and 
support for any REP candidate or proposal” (Art 2007, 339). The media followed a similar 
strategy painting the party as akin to the Nazis and stated that the Berlin election was a “protest 
vote and horrible mistake” (Art 2007, 339). This led the party to be characterized as politically 
illegitimate and helped to change public opinion on perception of the party. Finally, citizens took 
to the streets in protest which made it hard for party leaders to not only hold meetings but also to 
increase their political recruitment as the party was considered extreme. It is estimated that in the 
year following 1989, the REP lost 40 percent of its membership (Art 2007, 341). This strategy 
pursued by mainstream parties resulted in wasted votes, a characterization that the REP was 
politically illegitimate, and made it almost impossible to recruit new members. Despite issues of 
the transnational cleavage such as high unemployment, massive immigration, and EU integration 
pressures being on the forefront of contestation, political elites succeeded in rejecting the REP 
from cementing itself on the political scene.  
The success of the AfD is due to many factors including its local organization, party 
platform and leadership. In the midst of all the turmoil following the breakdown of the NPD, the 
AfD was able to emerge in 2013 in the aftermath of the eurocrisis. Fueled by populist sentiment 
and the aftermath of the financial crisis, the AfD became a protest party through which 
frustration from the public could be channeled.  In the first election they received 7.1 percent of 
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the vote and in September 2014 it gained around 10 percent of the vote in the eastern states of 
Saxony, Thuringia and Brandenburg (Backes 2018, 4-5). It also began to make small gains in 
West German states. As the party evolved internally and with the onset of recent terror attacks in 
2016, they gained 20.8 percent of the vote in Saxony-Anhalt and 14.2 percent in Berlin (Backes 
2018, 5). Its greatest success came in the 2017 federal elections where the AfD won 12.6 percent 
of the votes and gained 94 seats in the Bundestag.  
The electoral achievement of the AfD comes in part from its ability to meld historical 
German nationalism with new ideological frameworks such as Islamophobia and ‘white power’ 
in a way that is seen as less controversial and in defense of a national culture in the face of rising 
tides of immigration. The AfD presents itself as an alternative to the ‘old parties’ who according 
to them are controlled by the media and “on the whole toe the official line on any given issue,” 
making them insufficient to serve the true interests of the people in times of crisis (Backes 2018, 
6).  In campaign posters, they proclaim themselves as the “only bearer of truth and (common) 
sense whereas ‘others’ are implicitly addressed as a threat to common sense” (Berbuir et al 2015, 
165). This relates to cleavage theory since the AfD is proclaiming that mainstream parties are 
insufficient to respond to the new contentions of the day and that they are the only true party to 
speak on behalf of the people in face of the new conflicts that divide society.  In addition, the 
AfD is able to fill gaps in the party system with its conservative positions on sociocultural issues 
from the CDU who lost their “capability of integrating substantial parts of the political right” 
(Decker 2016, 15). The party was able to capture this end of the cleavage and gain success. By 
presenting itself as a more ‘moderate’ far-right party, it was able to overcome the stigmatization 
that stems from the history of Nazism as well as some of the organizational issues far-right 
parties have faced in the past.  
27 
 
Table 3: Electoral gains of far-right in Germany 1965 – 2019 (percentage of votes cast) 
Party Leadership and Organization  
The way in which parties are organized effectively translates into how strong of a 
political contender they will be. Parties in general must have strong leadership, sufficient party 
organization and party elites in order to project a good image. In the case of far-right parties, 
emphasis on a “highly exalted, personalist style of leadership” is key (Stockemer 2017, 43). In 
the case of the RN, a strong leader has always been at the head of the party and in the case of the 
AfD, its leadership suffered from internal disputes which led to its weakness. Both parties take 
advantage of conflicts surrounding the transnational cleavage and meld it into a coherent 
strategy.  
Jean Marie Le Pen, armed with his charismatic leadership and party control, navigated 
the RN from its humble beginnings to the established party we can recognize today. He 
succeeded in uniting the far-right groups that clung to different issues such as Vichy, 
decolonization and the Second World War. He was authoritative enough to act as a spokesperson 
for these various groups and with his past political experience in the 1950s with the Poujadiste 






















































(Stockemer 2017, 44). As with most far-right parties, immigration was a key component. Jean 
Marie excelled in melding this with other aspects of far-right ideology such as “authoritarianism, 
anti-egalitarianism and a focus on national sovereignty” (Stockemer 2017, 28).  
 Jean Marie’s daughter Marine had been a part of the party leadership since 1997 
as part of the central committee and worked to represent the RN in several national and local 
elections. She was elected president of the RN in 2011 with 67.6 percent of the vote and 
implemented an ambitious strategy to modernize the party (Mayer 2018, 9). Aside from the main 
goal of uniting the party and gaining new support from upper middle-class voters, her strategy of 
dédiabolisation (de-demonization) drew the most attention. This strategy was focused on ridding 
the party of its labels of racism, anti-Semitism and extremism attached to it by its opponents and 
to present the RN as a mainstream political party just like any other. Emphasis was placed on 
reversing Jean Marie’s previous anti-Semitic comments and Vice President of the party Louis 
Aliot stated that, “anti-Semitism prevents people from voting for us...as soon as you break this 
ideological stranglehold, you free the rest” (Mayer 2018, 10). The ability of Marine to keep 
control of the party during societal changes was a huge asset for the party overall. Her 
management of the party during her presidency has led the RN towards a path of “policy 
moderation and ideological deradicalization” which has greatly increased its appeal and further 
cemented it as a permanent actor on the French political scene (Almeida 2013, 167).  Her new 
program presents the RN as outsiders to the mainstream political scene. The party aims to 
strengthen the authority of the state through judicial system reforms and identifies culprits 
(international political and economic elites) for the “social, political and cultural decay that 
France has been experiencing” and wants to represent the common people with Marine as the 
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“political representative of the people, the embodiment of the popular will, the savior of France” 
(Stockemer 2017, 34-35).  
When Jean Marie continued to make anti-Semitic comments despite this new strategy, 
Marine took a bold move and had him officially removed from the party he helped to start in 
2015 signaling a break with the past and a move to repaint the party in a more acceptable image. 
She also infused the party with some radical leftist elements such as the defense of public 
services and increases in modest incomes and pensions which further revitalized the party and 
expanded its voter base (Stockemer and Amengay 2015, 374). These changes translated into 
never before seen electoral success for the RN. The party gained 17.9 percent of the votes in the 
2012 presidential election, an astounding 25 percent in the 2015 European Parliament elections, 
6.8 million votes in the second round of the 2015 regional elections, and Marine made it to the 
second round of the 2017 presidential elections which garnered international attention (Mayer 
2018, 11).    
The AfD suffered from leadership power struggles and internal disputes, like most 
previous far-right parties in Germany. With the financial crisis as a backdrop, there was a 
window for a new Eurosceptic party who rejected the further deepening of European integration 
to rise up and play a part in the contestation landscape. The AfD had unique structural 
advantages that led it to garner support later on. First and foremost, it came out of the disarray of 
the NPD which was unable to modernize itself to meet the current electoral challenges of the 
day. It also had an existing network of previous fringe parties such as the League of Free 
Citizens and the Civil Coalition that set a precedent for its fusion of economically liberal and 
socially conservative/nationalist positions (Decker 2016, 2). Additionally, many of the main AfD 
leaders came from the center-right camp (CDU, FPD) who became dissatisfied with the way the 
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CDU was dealing with the Eurozone crisis as well as its gradual move to the center on 
sociocultural issues such as the support of a modern immigration law and the recognition of 
same-sex civil unions.  
Primarily, its basis as a Eurosceptic party led it to attract a wide range of voters who were 
concerned about increasing integration at the EU level. Another crucial element of its success 
was its establishment of sub-national structures. In May of 2013, the AfD had regional branches 
is all 16 Bundeslander which led it to stabilize and grow a nation-wide organization, which 
previous far-right parties had failed in doing (Berbuir et al 2015, 155). In contrast to parties like 
the NPD, the AfD won over “disappointed middle-class voters from the established parties” and 
not just in regional strongholds (Backes 2018, 8). In a policy sense, the AfD is not all that 
different from established conservative agendas in Germany. The difference is that they have 
“filled a gaping hole on the German political right cause by Merkel shifting her ruling 
conservative Christian Democrats to the left” (Lees 2015, 11).  
In 2014, the party underwent a transformation that would propel it to even greater success 
in the coming years. The economically liberal wing of the party under the auspices of Bernd 
Lucke and Hans-Olaf Henkel broke away from the AfD to found the ALFA (Alliance for 
Progress and Change). They gained more approval as the refugee crisis exacerbated. The 
remainder of the party began to move closer to the profile of a far-right populist party and still 
gained significant success in the parliamentary elections for some federal states – they received 
24.2 percent of the vote in Saxony-Anhalt and 14.2 percent in Berlin in September 2016 (Backes 
2018, 6). These elections were a testament to the AfD’s ability to capture protest votes from 
supporters of traditional parties, from the SPD and even a small portion from the left-wing party. 
Furthermore, their right-wing extremist competitors suffered losses in all three federal states 
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serving to further establish the AfD as a successful far-right party. It is estimated that before the 
split the party had approximately 20,000 members and in subsequent years the membership was 
estimated to be 16,400 in 2015 (Decker 2016, 7). These numbers indicate that even after the 
split, the party was still able to retain and attract new members in order to further modernize the 
party.  
The AfD’s new 2017 Bundestag breakthrough could not only have a potential increase on 
the effective number of parties, but also could alter the political contestation space. Previous 
studies have found that the appeal of the AfD is stronger in Eastern Germany which could 
potentially reignite the territorial East-West cleavage on a stronger level (Lees 2015, 8-9). This 
has implications for the development of cleavage theory as well as the alignment of the German 
political system and should be examined in further research.  
Discussion  
While France and Germany did experience many of the same structural transformations 
in the political space in the post 1970s, the timing of their emergence stands in contrast to how 
we would expect a far-right party to fare given the conditions. While prominent issues such as 
immigration create “pressures that benefit right-wing parties, these pressures themselves do not 
create success” (Art 2007, 334). This informs us that while far-right parties did use immigration 
as their main line of issue in their platforms, it does not explain the whole picture. To further 
unravel the puzzle, we must look to cleavages as well as structural factors such as party 
leadership, electoral systems, and social framework conditions.  In the comparison, many factors 
were kept constant as can be seen in Table 1 with the variation being the drastic difference in 
timing of far-right parties.  
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In the face of conflict emanating from the transnational cleavage including growing 
integration at the EU level, the financial crisis, Euroscepticism, and the refugee crisis, far-right 
parties have presented themselves as the “defenders of ‘true’ European values against the 
encroachment of both non-European foreigners and the EU elite in Brussels” (Polyakova and 
Shekhovtsov 2016, 71). The refugee crisis has revealed “new EU faults lines cutting across those 
already laid by the economic crisis” (Heisbourg 2016, 10) which relates to the theme of cross 
cutting cleavages.   
While the transnational cleavage was present in both countries, Germany was hindered 
not only by a strong institutional resistance to National Socialism but also rife with internal party 
disputes. Furthermore, its federal structure made it difficult for far-right parties to find success 
past the local level and the turning point came when the AfD established a network of regional 
chapters to broaden their electoral message. A combination of historical, cultural and structural 
factors contributed to making Eurosceptic parties a ‘dark matter’ in German politics, despite 
there being dissatisfaction among the German population with the issues of the transnational 
cleavage (Lees 2015, 3). In the case of France – which theoretically should have a more 
restrictive electoral system for allowing small parties – we see the RN emerge as a model of a 
new party family. This is due in part to its strong leadership and coherent platform in which a 
strong master frame was able to be developed from which other emerging parties took notice. 
The similarity of these master frames and differences in their adoption give insight into 
“developmental interdependence” meaning that the trend of far-right parties in Europe is distinct 
and closely related (Van Hauwaert 2019, 148).  
In relation to the first expectation regarding institutionalized resistance to far-right parties 
in Germany, we can consider it confirmed. The analysis shows that while Germany had 
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contenders in the past such as the NPD and the REP, they never reached much success due to the 
process of marginalization implemented by mainstream parties. In addition, the resistance to a 
party that was somewhat similar to the Nazis is a strong factor that impeded the growth of 
similar movements before. No similar institutional or cultural resistance to Vichy existed in 
France. In a similar vein, party leadership plays into this. The RN had a strong leader with Jean 
Marie and power was successfully transferred to his daughter Marine. They both were 
advantageous in creating a cult of personality around them, something which the AfD was 
unable to do because of its internal disputes and financial issues.  
We can consider the second expectation regarding the presence of the transnational 
cleavage in both countries to be partially confirmed. Yes, we do see how far-right parties 
respond to issues of the transnational cleavage including immigration and national identity 
however, this cannot be the sole factor that explains the difference in timing of emergence. I 
would argue that institutional factors affected the ways in which parties could respond to and 
stake a claim to the transnational cleavage in contestation. This can be seen in the organizational 
difficulty in Germany to start a new party and the sentiment of aversion to anything akin to 
National Socialism.  
Knowledge of the transnational cleavage is enhanced through the analysis of France and 
Germany. Far-right parties do indeed take extreme positions on issues of the new cleavage by 
advocating for stricter immigration controls, denying multiculturalism and favoring nationalist 
retreat. The conflicts can be seen very clearly in the economic and refugee crisis which 
exacerbated many of underlying dimensions and provided a shock to the political system. Far-
right parties were able to be the “political beneficiaries” of this new crisis by tackling head on 
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the fears that voters had over societal transformations in a stronger way than mainstream parties 
(Heisbourg 2019, 10).  
Conclusion  
The extreme right in France has a long history, and the Rassemblement National (RN), 
formerly the Front National, emerged as a product of political revolution, party organization, and 
cleavage structures. When thinking of the far-right in Europe, the RN is usually thought of as the 
prime example due to its permanence on the French political scene since the 1970s and its use of 
a ‘winning formula’ that combined “an appeal to vigorous state authority and paternalism in the 
family with an endorsement of free market capitalism in the economy (Mayer 2018, 2). Its 
internal shift in leaders and consequently ideology that has propelled it to considerable electoral 
success. As a prototype of far-right parties in Europe, it has set a foundation and rooted itself 
firmly on the extreme pole of the transnational cleavage.  
The success of the AfD in Germany came as a surprise to many as the threat of the far-
right was perceived to be less extreme due to the legacy of Nazism and the way in which 
nationalist discourse was treated in the public sphere. However, with the refugee crisis in 2015, 
the party was able to gain significant electoral success which raised questions about the stability 
of the current party system and its response to the challenges that the electorate found to be 
mobilizing. The development of far-right parties previous to the AfD that were never able to 
make significant electoral gains such as the NPD and REP were hindered by poor leadership, 
financial hardships and a concentration of support and mobilization at the local level that did not 
translate to the national level.  
In the most recent 2019 European Parliament elections, the far-right coalition did make 
significant gains. However, voters also preferred to choose centrist liberals, which caused the 
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mainstream center parties to lose support (“Graphic Detail”). The results show that issues of the 
transnational cleavage such as immigration and identity will continue to play a large part in the 
conflict structure as the long-term effects of the economic and refugee crisis will still need to be 
addressed.  
Further research should examine local variation in regards to far-right voting behavior in 
each country to lead to an even more detailed understanding of the phenomenon. Additionally, 
more research should focus on the role of mainstream parties in the way they respond to far-right 
parties as another additional supply factor to examine. The findings of this thesis contribute to an 
explanation of a much larger puzzle surrounding the far-right party family, its emergence and 
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